SUPPLEMENT TO "IDEOLOGY AND PERFORMANCE IN PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS"

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
APPENDIX A: APPENDIX FIGURES

FIGURE A.1.—Number of employees in the OPM over time. *Notes*: Showing the number of OPM individuals over time (in 1000). Black line denotes all employees and the gray line denotes employees for whom names were not redacted. Note that since the OPM does not provide unique identifiers after 2014, we cannot compute the number of unique employees among those with redacted names.

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Guo Xu: guo.xu@berkeley.edu

FIGURE A.2.—Share of federal employees matched to partisan affiliation data. *Notes*: Share of OPM individuals with non-redacted names who could be matched to the L2 voter registration data over time.

(a) Presidential Appointments


(b) Senior Executive Service—Non-career

(c) Schedule C

FIGURE A.3.—Partisan affiliation of political appointees—by type. *Notes*: Party shares for different types of political appointments over time. Panel A shows presidential appointments. Panel B shows non-career senior executive service. Panel C shows Schedule C appointments. Dashed vertical lines mark presidential terms.

(a) Competitive Career Service

(b) Senior Executive Service—Career

(c) Excepted Service—Non-political

FIGURE A.4.—Partisan affiliation of civil servants—by type. *Notes*: Party shares for different types of (non-political) civil servants over time. Panel A shows the competitive career service. Panel B shows the career senior executive service. Panel C shows the non-political excepted service. Dashed vertical lines mark presidential terms.

FIGURE A.5.—Number of identifiable procurement officers over time. *Notes*: Number of individually identifiable procurement officers for contracts created in a given year. Contracts to services and works contracts in our analysis sample (see Table B.III).

FIGURE A.6.—Share of procurement officers matched to partisan affiliation data. *Notes*: Black solid line shows share of active procurement officers who could be matched to the OPM. Dashed gray line shows match rate to the L2 voter registration data, conditional on being matched to the personnel (OPM) data.

FIGURE A.7.—Share of procurement officers by party affiliation. *Notes*: Share of active procurement officers by party affiliation over time. The party shares for procurement officers closely track the shares for the entire bureaucracy (see Figure 3).

FIGURE A.8.—Greater political alignment decreases cost overrun. *Notes*: The figure shows the partial correlation between *Share politically aligned* and *Relative cost overrun* in a bin scatter plot. The relationship shown is after partialing out individual fixed effects and year × quarter fixed effects (see Table IV, column 4).

FIGURE A.9.—Cost overrun and political alignment—dropping one department at a time. *Notes*: Figure reports point estimates of the political alignment effect (specification from Table IV, column 1 of the paper) dropping one department at a time. Reporting 95% confidence intervals.

FIGURE A.10.—*Supervisor interaction and political alignment. Notes*: Each row reports the regression co-efficient of *Probability Democrat × Democrat President* from equation (4) of the paper for different dependent variables together with 95% confidence intervals, based on standard errors clustered at the Sex × Minority × Department level. All dependent variables are on the Likert scale (1: Strongly disagree, 5: Strongly agree) and standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. *Supervisor interaction index* computes the average of all measures in their respective panel. *Probability Democrat* is the share of OPM civil servants who are registered Democrat in a given sex × minority status × department cell.

APPENDIX B: APPENDIX TABLES

TABLE B.I
POLITICAL CYCLES AMONG CIVIL SERVANTS—HIRING MARGIN.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Employee is Democrat				Employee is Republican			
Sample:	All Civil Servants	Competitive Service	Career SES	Excepted Service	All Civil Servants	Competitive Service	Career SES	Excepted Service
President Democrat	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.030 (0.010)	0.007 (0.001)				
President Republican					0.000 (0.001)	−0.000 (0.001)	0.026 (0.009)	0.004 (0.001)
Observations	1,979,703	1,077,837	9242	1,181,448	1,979,703	1,077,837	9242	1,181,448
Effect size	+0.5%	+0.4%	+5.7%	+1.5%	+0.2%	−0.1%	+10.1%	+1.5%
Bureau FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Regression estimates of the party alignment effect. The unit of observation is the individual-quarter, restricting the sample to individuals who were hired in the specific category in a given quarter. In columns 1–4, the dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the civil servant is a Democrat, and 0 otherwise. In columns 5–8, the dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the civil servant is a Republican, and 0 otherwise. *President Democrat* is a dummy that is 1 if the president is a Democrat, and 0 otherwise. *President Republican* is a dummy that is 1 if the president is a Republican, and 0 otherwise. The sample covers all matched individuals between 1997 and 2019. Columns 1 and 5 restrict the sample to all civil servants, columns 2 and 6 restrict the sample to the competitive career service, columns 3 and 7 restrict the sample to career senior executive service officers, columns 4 and 8 restrict the sample to employees in the non-political excepted service. All regressions include a linear time trend, and bureau fixed effects. The effect size is defined as the estimated coefficient divided by the mean of the dependent variable when the president is Republican (columns 1–4) or Democrat (columns 5–8). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level.

TABLE B.II
POLITICAL ALIGNMENT AND CAREER PROGRESSION OF POLITICAL APPOINTEES.

	(1)	(2)
	Log total pay	
Politically aligned	0.0032 (0.0131)	−0.0044 (0.0085)
Observations	134,351	129,508
Individual FEs	Yes	Yes
Year-Quarter FEs	Yes	
Year-Quarter-Bureau FEs		Yes

Note: Regression estimates of the party alignment effect on pay. The unit of observation is the individual-quarter. The sample covers all matched political appointees between 1997 and 2019. The dependent variable is the log annual total pay. *Politically aligned* is a dummy that is 1 if the civil servant and president are from the same party. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level.

TABLE B.III

SAMPLE RESTRICTIONS FOR PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS.

Sample	Mean characteristics			Contracts left in sample
	Size	Duration	Year	
Sample restrictions				
All service & works contracts (excluding R&D) 2004–2019	9.638	4.622	2010.78	7,936,258
Drop Department of Defense	9.277	4.616	2010.78	5,130,057
Drop Indefinite Vehicle Contracts (IDV) [3]	–	–	2010.74	4,853,069
Drop lease and rental contracts [1]	9.266	4.469	2011.26	4,030,893
Drop contracts performed outside the US [1] [2]	9.276	4.513	2011.34	3,791,416
Drop already initialized contracts [3]	9.257	4.495	2011.24	3,646,877
Drop those with missing email addresses	9.236	4.485	2011.45	3,533,846
Matching				
Drop contracts with anonymous creator (e.g., admin@dept.gov)	9.658	4.650	2012.10	2,848,375
Drop those unmatched to OPM (personnel data)	9.713	4.708	2012.41	1,661,268
Drop those unmatched to L2 (voter registration data)	9.729	4.713	2012.44	1,217,148
Drop missing/inconsistent data [1][2][3]	9.833	4.706	2012.62	1,079,923

Note: Table documents the sample restrictions moving from the full sample to the final analysis sample, reporting the mean characteristics and the number of remaining contracts after each stage. *Size* is the (log) expected contract size, *Duration* is the (log) expected contract duration, and *Year* is the year the contract was initiated. Sample restrictions follow the standard procurement literature. [1] denotes restrictions from Decarolis, Giuffrida, Iossa, Mollisi, and Spagnolo (2020), [2] are restrictions from Kang and Miller (2020), and [3] are restrictions from Carril, Gonzales-Lira, and Walker (2021). We do not report mean characteristics for Indefinite Vehicle Contracts as—by definition—they do not have a fixed size and duration.

TABLE B.IV

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS—PROCUREMENT OUTCOMES.

	(1) Mean	(2) Median	(3) IQR	(4) Obs.
Politically aligned	0.425	0	1	1,079,923
Share aligned	0.421	0	1	1,079,923
Expected obligation (in $)	90,213.38	16,910.4	65,664	1,079,923
Actual obligation (in $)	118,211.4	17,544	76,193.6	1,079,923
Expected contract duration (days)	214.59	148	327	1,079,923
Actual contract duration (days)	311.15	199	321	1,079,923
Modifications	1.452	0	2	1,079,923
Terminated ($\times$ 100)	0.411	0	0	1,079,923
Competed	0.244	0	0	1,079,923
Number of offers received	3.811	1	2	1,079,923

Note: Reporting descriptive statistics (mean, median, interquartile range, and total observations) for procurement outcomes and the key explanatory variables. The unit of observation is the contract. *Politically aligned* is a dummy that is 1 if the procurement officer and president are from the same party when the contract was created, and 0 otherwise. *Share politically aligned* is the share of a given contract's expected duration in which the procurement officer and the president were from the same party. *Expected obligation* is the expected contract size at time of initiation, and *Actual obligation* is the actual contract size at time of completion. *Expected contract duration* is the number of expected days of contract duration at time of initiation, and *Actual contract duration* is the number of actual days between initiation and completion date. *Modification* denotes the number of ex post modifications. *Terminated* is a dummy that is 1 if the contract was terminated, rescaled by 100 for legibility. *Competed* is a dummy that is 1 if the contract was awarded by full and open competition. *Number of offers* is the number of offers received by bidders.

TABLE B.V

ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF PROCUREMENT PERFORMANCE.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Cost performance (Decarolis et al. 2020)					
Mean of dep. var	0.907	0.907	0.907	0.907	0.907	0.907
Politically aligned	0.005	0.005	0.005			
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)			
Share politically aligned				0.006	0.006	0.005
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Year × Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Department × Year FEs			Yes			Yes
Observations	1,079,773	1,079,773	1,079,773	1,079,773	1,079,773	1,079,773

Note: The unit of observation is the contract. The dependent variable is the cost performance measure used by Decarolis et al. (2020). *Politically aligned* is a dummy that is 1 if the procurement officer and president are from the same party in the year the contract was created, and 0 otherwise. *Share politically aligned* is the share of a given contract's expected duration in which the procurement officer and the president were from the same party. Controls comprise: *Years of experience fixed effects*, *Log(Contract size in USD)*, *Log(expected duration in days)*, *Log(total contracts created in a given year and quarter)*, *industry (NAICS)* fixed effects, *award type* FEs, *contract pricing* FEs, *product service code* FEs. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the procurement officer-level.

TABLE B.VI

ALTERNATIVE THRESHOLDS FOR WINSORIZING.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Relative cost overrun				
Mean of dep. var	0.365	0.327	0.274	0.186	0.168
Panel A: Political alignment at time of award					
Politically aligned	−0.017	−0.018	−0.017	−0.011	−0.010
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Panel B: Share of contract duration politically aligned					
Share politically aligned	−0.026	−0.024	−0.021	−0.013	−0.011
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Winsorizing fraction in each tail	0.005	0.01	0.025	0.05	0.075
Year × Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department × Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,079,923	1,079,923	1,079,923	1,079,923	1,079,923

Note: The unit of observation is the contract. *Relative cost overrun* is the difference between the actual costs and the expected costs, normalized by the expected costs (see Equation (1)). *Politically aligned* is a dummy that is 1 if the procurement officer and president are from the same party in the year the contract was created, and 0 otherwise. *Share politically aligned* is the share of a given contract's expected duration in which the procurement officer and the president were from the same party. Controls comprise: *Years of experience fixed effects*, *Log(Contract size in USD)*, *Log(expected duration in days)*, *Log(total contracts created in a given year and quarter)*, *industry (NAICS)* fixed effects, *award type* FEs, *contract pricing* FEs, *product service code* FEs. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the procurement officer-level.

TABLE B.VII

COST OVERRUN BY INITIAL CONTRACT SIZE QUARTILE.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
			Relative cost overrun		
Mean of dep. var	0.186	0.0898	0.127	0.186	0.333
Panel A: Politically aligned					
Politically aligned	−0.011	−0.004	−0.006	−0.015	−0.015
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Panel B: Share aligned					
Share politically aligned	−0.013	−0.004	−0.006	−0.017	−0.022
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Observations	1,079,923	267,587	267,951	267,709	268,451
Year × Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department × Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	Full	Quartile in initial contract size			
		1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Cut-off ($)		[0, 5k)	[5k, 17k)	[17k, 71k)	[71k, ∞)

Note: The unit of observation is the contract. Column 1 includes all contracts, while columns 2–5 include contracts in the first, second, third, and fourth quartile of initial contract size, respectively. *Relative cost overrun* is the difference between the actual costs and the expected costs, normalized by the expected costs (see Equation (1)). *Politically aligned* is a dummy that is 1 if the procurement officer and president are from the same party in the year the contract was created, and 0 otherwise. *Share politically aligned* is the share of a given contract's expected duration in which the procurement officer and the president were from the same party. Controls comprise: *Years of experience fixed effects*, *Log(Contract size in USD)*, *Log(expected duration in days)*, *Log(total contracts created in a given year and quarter)*, *industry (NAICS)* fixed effects, *award type* FEs, *contract pricing* FEs, *product service code* FEs. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the procurement officer-level.

TABLE B.VIII

DELAYS BY EXPECTED DURATION QUARTILE.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
			Relative delays		
Mean of dep. var	0.424	0.387	0.506	0.420	0.379
Panel A: Politically aligned					
Politically aligned	−0.001	0.024	−0.005	−0.017	−0.017
	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Panel B: Share aligned					
Share politically aligned	−0.002	0.022	−0.006	−0.022	−0.010
	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Observations	1,074,675	264,771	267,511	208,386	325,104
Year × Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department × Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	*Full*		Quartile in initial duration		
		1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Cut-off (days)		[0, 37)	[37, 148)	[148, 364)	[364, ∞)

Note: The unit of observation is the contract. Column 1 includes all contracts, while columns 2–5 include contracts in the first, second, third, and fourth quartile of expected duration, respectively. *Relative delays* is the difference between the actual contract duration and the expected duration, normalized by the expected duration (see Equation (1)). *Politically aligned* is a dummy that is 1 if the procurement officer and president are from the same party in the year the contract was created, and 0 otherwise. *Share politically aligned* is the share of a given contract's expected duration in which the procurement officer and the president were from the same party. Controls comprise: *Years of experience fixed effects*, *Log(Contract size in USD)*, *Log(expected duration in days)*, *Log(total contracts created in a given year and quarter)*, *industry (NAICS)* fixed effects, *award type FEs*, *contract pricing FEs*, *product service code FEs*. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the procurement officer-level.

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TABLE B.IX

TASK ASSIGNMENT AND POLITICAL ALIGNMENT, COMPLEX CONTRACTS.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Expected		Predicted	
	Contract size	Duration	Overrun	Delay
Panel A: Expected cost ≥ $25,000				
Mean of dep. var	11.78	5.274	0.234	0.509
Politically aligned	0.023	0.001	0.000	0.001
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	450,664			
Panel B: Expected duration ≥ 148 days				
Mean of dep. var	12.01	5.918	0.269	0.462
Politically aligned	0.029	−0.000	−0.000	0.002
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	299,877	299,877	299,877	299,877
Year × Month FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: Unit of observation is the contract level. *Politically aligned* is a dummy that is 1 if the procurement officer and president are from the same party. *Expected contract size* is the (log) expected size (in USD) of the contract at time of award. *Expected duration* is the (log) expected contract length (in days) at time of award. *Predicted overrun* (*Predicted delay*) is the cost overrun (delay) predicted by regressing our measure of cost overrun (delay) on the full set of contract characteristics: *Log(Contract size in USD)*, *Log(expected duration in days)*, *Log(total contracts created in a given year and quarter)*, Industry FEs, award type FEs, contract pricing FEs, and product service code FEs. Panel A restricts the sample to only procurement contracts with an expected contract size of at least $25,000. Panel B restricts the sample to only procurement contracts with above median duration (corresponding to contracts with a projected duration of at least 153 days). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the procurement officer-level.

TABLE B.X

MISSION IMPORTANCE, POLITICAL ALIGNMENT, AND COST OVERRUN.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Share PSC		Relative cost overrun		
Mean of dep. var	0.0438	0.0438	0.186	0.186	0.186
Politically aligned	0.001	0.000	−0.011	−0.011	−0.011
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Share PSC				0.106	
				(0.043)	
Year × Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls		Yes			Yes
Department × Year FEs		Yes			Yes
Observations	1,079,923	1,079,923	1,079,923	1,079,923	1,079,923

Note: The unit of observation is the contract. The dependent variable in columns 1–2 is the share of contracts that a department procures with the same product or service code (PSC). In columns 3–5, the dependent variable is relative cost overrun, as measured by the difference between the actual costs and the expected costs, normalized by the expected costs. *Politically aligned* is a dummy that is 1 if the procurement officer and president are from the same party when the contract was created, and 0 otherwise. Controls comprise: *Years of experience fixed effects*, *Log(Contract size in USD)*, *Log(expected duration in days)*, *Log(total contracts created in a given year and quarter)*, *industry (NAICS)* fixed effects, *award type FEs*, *contract pricing FEs*, *product service code FEs*. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the procurement officer-level.

TABLE B.XI

PROCUREMENT PERFORMANCE AND SUPPLIER SELECTION.

	(1) Competed	(2) IHS # offers	(3) Provider aligned	(4) Relative cost overrun	(5) Relative cost overrun
Mean of dep. var	0.252	1.252	0.0944	0.185	0.185
Politically aligned	−0.004 (0.004)	−0.008 (0.017)	−0.005 (0.002)	−0.012 (0.004)	−0.013 (0.004)
Year × Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department × Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Supplier firm FEs					Yes
Observations	1,013,069	1,013,069	1,013,069	1,013,069	1,013,069

Note: The unit of observation is the contract. *Competed* is a dummy that is 1 if the contract was awarded by full and open competition. *IHS # offers* is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the number of offers received by bidders. *Provider aligned* is a dummy that is 1 if the supplier firm is owned by a minority or disadvantaged woman and the procurement officer a Democrat. *Relative cost overrun* is the difference between the actual costs and the expected costs, normalized by the expected costs (see Equation (1)). *Politically aligned* is a dummy that is 1 if the procurement officer and president are from the same party when the contract was created, and 0 otherwise. *Supplier firm FEs* are based on the recipient unique identifiers (DUNS) from the procurement data. Controls comprise: *Years of experience fixed effects*, *Log(Contract size in USD)*, *Log(expected duration in days)*, *Log(total contracts created in a given year and quarter)*, *industry (NAICS)* fixed effects, *award type* FEs, *contract pricing* FEs, *product service code* FEs. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the procurement officer-level.

TABLE B.XII

PROMOTION INCENTIVES DO NOT VARY BY POLITICAL ALIGNMENT.

	(1) Promoted	(2) Demoted	(3) Exit
Mean of dep. var	2.609	0.418	4.629
Current political alignment	−0.021 (0.211)	0.139 (0.086)	0.173 (0.342)
Average relative overruns	−0.019 (0.334)	0.031 (0.166)	−0.097 (0.413)
Average relative delays	−0.364 (0.326)	−0.097 (0.168)	0.407 (0.388)
Current political alignment × Avg. relative overruns	−0.196 (0.351)	−0.149 (0.119)	−0.295 (0.441)
Current political alignment × Avg. relative delays	0.218 (0.345)	−0.045 (0.133)	0.465 (0.460)
Individual FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department × Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party × Avg. cost overrun & delay	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	34,691	34,691	34,691

Note: The unit of observation is the individual × year. *Promoted* is a dummy that is 1 if the officer experienced an increase in the pay grade. *Demoted* is a dummy that is 1 if the officer experienced a decrease in the pay grade. *Exit* is a dummy that is 1 if the officer left the civil service in the given year. *Promoted*, *Demoted*, and *Exit* are scaled by 100 to ease the legibility of the resulting coefficient estimates. *Current political alignment* is a dummy that is 1 if the procurement officer and president are from the same party in the current year. *Average relative overruns (delays)* are the average relative cost overruns (delays) for contracts that were completed in the given year. Both average contract performance measures are standardized to have a mean 0 and SD 1. *Party × Avg. cost overrun & delay* comprise the average relative overrun and delay measures interacted with the Democrat and Republican dummies. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the procurement officer-level.

TABLE B.XIII

MORALE AND MISSION INCREASE WITH POLITICAL ALIGNMENT.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Pr(Dem) × Dem pres		
	Coeff.	Std. err.	Obs.
Panel A: General morale			
The work I do is important	0.065	(0.010)	4,075,397
Employees have a feeling of personal empowerment	0.103	(0.015)	4,025,301
Work gives feeling of personal accomplishment	0.049	(0.012)	4,619,183
Willing to put in the extra effort to get a job done	0.072	(0.012)	3,959,941
Constantly looking for ways to do my job better	0.082	(0.011)	3,964,771
I like the kind of work I do	0.025	(0.014)	4,088,489
Morale index	0.101	(0.014)	3,749,545
Panel B: Identification with mission			
My work relates to the agency's goals and priorities	0.109	(0.011)	4,604,602
Satisfied with information from organization	0.069	(0.012)	4,626,062
I know what is expected of me on the job	0.078	(0.011)	4,462,187
Agency is successful at accomplishing its mission	0.063	(0.014)	4,410,053
Mission index	0.110	(0.014)	4,325,660
Year FEs	Yes		
Department × Year FEs	Yes		
Sex × Minority × Department FEs	Yes		

Note: Each row reports the regression coefficient of *Prob. Democrat × Democrat President* from Equation (4) for different dependent variables, where *Prob. Democrat* is the share of Democrat civil servants in the OPM 1997–2019 in a given Sex × Minority × Department cell. All dependent variables are on the Likert scale (1: Strongly disagree, 5: Strongly agree) and standardized to have a mean 0 and SD 1. Column 1 reports the estimated interaction effect of *Pr(Dem) × Democrat President*. Column 2 reports the associated standard error and column 3 reports the total number of observations corresponding to the regression. *Morale index* and *Mission index* are averages of all measures in their respective panel. Standard errors are clustered at the Sex × Minority × Department-level.

TABLE B.XIV

MORALE, MISSION, AND POLITICAL ALIGNMENT BY SUPERVISORY STATUS.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Morale index		Mission index	
Pr(Democrat) × Dem. president	0.114	0.071	0.141	0.090
	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.043)
Sample	Supervisory	Non-supervisory	Supervisory	Non-supervisory
Observations	803,417	2,928,863	931,752	3,375,560
Department × Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Race × Sex FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department FEs	All	All	All	All
Test of equality (*p*-value)	0.318		0.219	
Mean of dep. var	0.259	−0.0632	0.214	−0.0516

Note: Unit of observation is an individual-year. Relating morale and mission-related attitudes from the FEVS survey to political alignment by supervisory status. *Morale index* and *Mission index* are standardized averages of all morale (mission)-related outcomes (see Figure 5 in the paper). *Pr(Democrat)* is the share of OPM civil servants who are registered Democrat in a given Sex × Minority × Department cell. *Dem. president* is a dummy that is 1 if the president in office is a Democrat, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the Sex × Minority × Department-level.

APPENDIX C: APPENDIX DOCUMENTATION: OPM

In this section, we provide additional details on the OPM data, and on the process of matching the data to the L2 party registration data. Specifically, we describe *(i)* two limitations of the OPM data, and how we deal with them, *(ii)* the mapping between "type of appointment" codes in the OPM and our categorization of employees into "political appointees" and "civil servants," and *(iii)* the matching between the OPM and L2.

C.1. *Data Limitations in the OPM*

The OPM data come with two caveats. The first caveat is that the data do not include information on employees in a number of departments and bureaus. These are: employees in defense and security (Air Force, Army, Navy, Defense, Defense Consolidated Metropolitan Technical Personnel Center, Defense Career Management and Support Agency, FBI, Secret Service, DEA, ATF, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Office of the Director of National Intelligence), the U.S. Mint, Foreign Service personnel of the State Department, IRS, U.S. Postal Service, Postal Regulatory Commission, White House Office, Office of the Vice President, Office of Policy Development, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Tennessee Valley Authority, Panama Canal Commission, a number of legislative branch bureaus (Members or employees of Congress, Architect of the Capitol, Botanic Garden, Library of Congress, General Accountability Office, Congressional Budget Office, Stennis Center for Public Service, Office of Compliance), Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Foreign Nationals Overseas, Public Health Service's Commissioned Officer Corps, and Non-appropriated fund employees. Furthermore, employees in a few occupations (mostly law enforcement officers and nuclear engineers) are excluded, independently of the department where they are employed.

The second caveat of the OPM data is that, starting in the third quarter of 2014, the data do not include employee identifiers, which allow to easily track over time employees with similar names. For this reason, we created employee identifiers for employees appearing after the third quarter of 2014. We do so on the basis of information on the employee's full name and education level, which are the two demographics which are included in the data for the full sample period (since we do not have information on age after 2016). Specifically, for each year, we assign the same employee identifier to all observations with the same employee's full name and education. We can use data for the 1997–2014q2 (which contain identifiers provided by the OPM) period to validate our approach to the creation of identifiers: reassuringly, in the 1997–2014q2 period, around 99% of observations with the same employee name and education level in a year are assigned the same identifier; similarly, around 99% of identifiers in a year have no variation in employee name and education level (which can theoretically be possible, if an employee changes name or obtains additional training). We then match employees in the 2014q3–2019 period (for which we created personal identifiers) with those in the 1997–2014q2 period (for which we have OPM identifiers) based on full name and education. Specifically, we start by matching employees in the 2014 (for quarters 3 and 4) to 2014 (for quarters 1 and 2); for those employees not found, we match them to employees in 2013; for those employees not found, we match them to employees in 2012; we continue with this procedure up until 1997. We then repeat the same procedure for employees in 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 (namely, employees in each of these years are matched to employees in the previous years).

C.2. *Type of Appointment Codes*

Throughout the paper, we differentiate employees between those who are in a position filled by a political appointee, and those in which appointments and removals are formally insulated from political influence. We do so on the basis of the OPM variable "type of appointment." The mapping between "type of appointment" codes and our categories is as following:

- Presidential appointments in top executive position: code 36 (Executive—Excepted Service Permanent), and code 46 (Executive—Excepted Service Nonpermanent)
- Politically appointed members of the Senior Executive Service (SES): code 55 (Non-career SES permanent), code 60 (Limited Term SES—Non-permanent), and code 65 (Limited Emergency SES—Non-permanent).
- Schedule C appointees: code 44 (Schedule C—Excepted Service Non-permanent).
- Competitive service: code 10 (Career—Competitive Service Permanent), code 15 (Career-Conditional—Competitive Service Permanent), and code 20 (Competitive Service Non-permanent).
- Career members of the Senior Executive Service (SES): code 50 (Career SES permanent).
- Excepted service: code 30 (Schedule A—Excepted Service Permanent), code 32 (Schedule B—Excepted Service Permanent), code 35 (Schedule D—Excepted Service Permanent), code 38 (Other—Excepted Service Permanent), code 40 (Schedule A—Excepted Service Non-permanent), code 42 (Schedule B—Excepted Service Non-permanent), code 45 (Schedule D—Excepted Service Nonpermanent), and code 48 (Other—Excepted Service Non-permanent).

C.3. *Matching*

We match federal government employees to the L2 voter registration data using a combination of name, state and county of residence, and age (as of the last quarter in which the employee is observed in the data).[S1] We consider the state and county of employment as an employee's state and county of residence. We allow for multiple states/counties of residence for the small minority of employees employed in multiple locations. We assign Virginia and Maryland, in addition to D.C., as possible states of residence for individuals employed in D.C.[S2] We perform the matching using only the initials of first and/or mid-name for the minority of federal employees with only the initials of first and/or midname reported in the data. The OPM reports information on employees' age using a 5-year age window (starting from 15–19 to 70–74). For employees over 74 (or 64, for some years), the OPM only reports the age window as "75 or more" (or "65 or more"). Therefore, we implement our matching by age by specifying that the year of birth of the individual in the L2 data must be in the 5-year window implied by the employee's age range window (while for employees older than 65 or older than 75, we only specified an upper bound to the year of birth of the individual in the OPM data).

We implement several steps of matching. First, we match employees to the L2 wave that is closest in time to the year in which we observe the employee in the OPM data, using

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[S1]While in the paper we focus on the period 1997–2019, we also match federal employees using OPM data from 2020 and 2021, which were available at the time in which we performed the matching (July 2022). All the numbers reported in this section pertain only to individuals employed up to 2019.

[S2]In our matching procedure, successful matches on state/county are those in which the state/county of residence in the L2 voter registration data is among the employee's possible states/counties of residence inferred from the OPM data.

TABLE C.I

MATCHING STEPS.

	Variables used	L2 Wave	Number matched	Share of matched
1.	first name + midname + last name + state + county + age range	closest wave	525,142	26.45
2.	first name + last name + state + county + age range	closest wave	186,896	9.41
3.	first name + midname + last name + state + age range	closest wave	402,866	20.29
4.	first name + last name + state + age range	closest wave	264,095	13.30
5.	first name + midname + last name + age range	closest wave	129,809	6.54
6.	first name + last name + age range	closest wave	79,263	3.99
7.	first name + midname + last name + state	closest wave	130,084	6.55
8.	first name + last name + state	closest wave	52,267	2.63
9.	first name + midname + last name + state + county + age range	other waves	9856	0.50
10.	first name + last name + state + county + age range	other waves	3598	0.18
11.	first name + midname + last name + state + age range	other waves	10,115	0.51
12.	first name + last name + state + age range	other waves	11,602	0.58
13.	first name + midname + last name + age range	other waves	13,791	0.69
14.	first name + last name + age range	other waves	12,208	0.61
15.	first name + midname + last name + state	other waves	10,264	0.52
16.	first name + last name + state	other waves	6461	0.33
17.	Multiple matches sharing same partisan affiliation	closest and other waves	137,409	6.92
Total			1,985,726	100

eight different combinations of first name, midname, last name, state, county, and age range.[S3] We then repeat each of the steps of matching, allowing employees to be matched to the three L2 waves other than the one that is closest in time to the year in which we observe them in the OPM data. This gives us a total of 16 steps of matching. Importantly, at each step of the matching, we consider as unmatched cases in which a federal employee is matched to multiple records in the L2 voter registration data, or cases in which an individual in the L2 voter registration data is matched to multiple employees.

Finally, for federal bureaucrats who are still unmatched, we allow for multiple matches with the L2 data: within each step of matching, we can obtain information on partisan affiliation of bureaucrats who are matched to multiple individuals in L2, if all candidate matches share the same party affiliation. For instance, if John Doe, who lives in California and is born in 1958, is matched to multiple individuals in L2 with the same name, state, and year of birth, but sharing the same affiliation as democrat, we can confidently assign a democratic affiliation to this federal bureaucrat.

Overall, we are able to successfully match 1,985,726 out of the 2,940,914 bureaucrats in our sample, for a 67.5% matching rate. Table C.I summarizes our matching steps, and the number and share of employees matched in each step.

[S3]Specifically, we match employees appearing in the period 1997–2014 in the OPM to the 2014 L2 wave, employees appearing in the period 2015–2016 in the OPM to the 2016 L2 wave, employees appearing in the period 2017–2018 in the OPM to the 2018 L2 wave, and employees appearing in 2019–2021 in the OPM to the 2020 L2 wave. If an employee appears for multiple periods in the OPM, we match her to each of the closest L2 waves for each period.

APPENDIX D: APPENDIX DOCUMENTATION: PROCUREMENT

D.1. *Sample Selection*

Appendix Table B.III summarizes the steps we take to get from the raw data to the final analysis sample. We start with the set of procurement contracts classified as service and works. In contrast to products, these are contract types where the vendor's effort can influence the outcome post-award, allowing us to construct cost overrun and delay measures (Decarolis et al. (2020)). These contracts can be identified using product service codes. We follow Carril, Gonzales-Lira, and Walker (2021) and also exclude R&D contracts since they are subject to a unique set of acquisition rules (FAR Part 35). This yields a total number of initial procurement contracts of 7,936,258.

Unfortunately, the OPM data do not provide the names of Department of Defense (DoD) employees. We therefore exclude from the analysis all DoD contracts. This reduces the sample of contracts to 5,130,057. In the next step, we drop indefinite vehicle contracts (IDV). These are contracts where the quantity of the supplies and services is not explicitly defined ex ante, making it difficult to compute reliable measures of overrun and delays. This reduces the number of contracts to 4,853,069.

Following Decarolis et al. (2020), we exclude lease and rental contracts from the analysis. These are contracts where ex post effort and thus cost overrun and delays are limited. This reduces our sample to 4,030,893 contracts. We then drop all contracts performed outside of the United States, leaving us with a sample of 3,791,416. This is another standard assumption that is followed in the literature (Decarolis et al. (2020), Kang and Miller (2020)) as the cost structure and contracting rules for non-U.S. contracts differ significantly. Finally, we drop the small number of contracts that were already in process (and for which we thus cannot measure the initial contract size and expected duration). This reduces the sample to 3,646,877 contracts. Finally, we drop those contracts where we have missing e-mail addresses, resulting in a sample of 3,533,846 contracts.

D.2. *Matching*

To link the 3,533,846 contracts to the personnel data and party affiliation, we use individual identifiers of procurement officers based on their email addresses. Each contract in the federal procurement database contains the email identifier for the individual who created the procurement contract (e.g., JOHN.SMITH@dept.gov), as well as the email addresses of those who subsequently modified the contract.[S4] We can thus match the officer based on the email address and the corresponding bureau to the personnel data. To increase the match rate, we assign a contract to the first procurement officer for whom we have party affiliation data. In 98% of the cases, this coincides with the officer who initiated the contract.

A limitation in this setting is that not all procurement contracts contain email addresses indicating the names of the assigned procurement officers. Instead, email addresses might only list a code or generic function (e.g., terminal1@dept.gov, admin@dept.gov). Since these contracts cannot be linked to individuals, we omit them from our analysis, reducing our sample to 2,848,375 (see Appendix Table B.III). As Appendix Table B.III shows, these contracts with anonymous email addresses tend to be smaller contracts in terms of initial contract size and duration. They also happen to be created earlier in our sample period

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[S4]Most of the contracts (79%) are overseen by a single officer, as measured by the number of distinct email identifiers. Almost all contracts (95%) are overseen by fewer than three procurement officers.

of 2004–2019. Appendix Figure A.5 shows the total number of procurement officers over time. Since contracts are less likely to have anonymous email addresses in the later years, we see a gradual increase in the number of identifiable procurement officers over time. After 2010, the total number of procurement officers is at around 11,000.

While all email addresses list a full surname, we often only have the initial of the first name (e.g., JSMITH@dept.gov). Furthermore, middle names are often omitted, making it difficult to uniquely identify individuals with common last names and first name initials. We therefore use information from the Govtribe.com database, which includes the full names of officers corresponding to a given email address.

We match in multiple steps. In the first step, we match individuals uniquely to those in the personnel data set based on their exact full name and bureau. As with the matching of the OPM and L2 data, we proceed by using different combinations of the first name, middle name, and last name:
- Step 1: first name + midname + last name + bureau
- Step 2: first name + midname initial + last name + bureau
- Step 3: first name + last name + bureau
- Step 4: last name + first name + bureau
- Step 5: last name + first name + midname + bureau
- Step 6: last name + first name + midname initial + bureau
- Step 7: last name + first name initial + bureau
- Step 8: last name + first name initial + midname initial + bureau
- Step 9: first name initial + last name + bureau
- Step 10: first name initial + mid name initial + last name + bureau

In the second step, for those with multiple matches, we disambiguate when possible by matching to the individual whose occupation is explicitly classified as a procurement officer.[S5] Overall, we are able to match 54% of the procurement officers (or 58% of all contracts) to the OPM. As Appendix Table B.III shows, the contracts that could not be matched to the personnel records tend to be smaller (both in contract size and duration) and created earlier. Appendix Figure A.6 (gray line) shows the match rate from the procurement identifiers to the OPM data over time.

Finally, we restrict the sample to the 88% of OPM-matched procurement officers who have party affiliation from the L2 data set.[S6] This reduces the sample of contracts to 1,217,148. In the last step, we drop observations for which data are missing or inconsistent, resulting in a final analysis sample of 1,079,923 contracts. Appendix Figure A.7 shows the share of procurement officers broken down by party over time. The pattern closely resemble the results using the full sample of civil servants (see Figure 3). The share of Democrat procurement officers remains around 50% throughout the sample period. At the same time, there is a gradual monotonic decline in the share of Republican officers, which is offset by an increase in independents.

APPENDIX E: ROBUSTNESS OF RESULTS TO DIFFERENT SAMPLE RESTRICTIONS

In this appendix, we show that our main results are substantively unchanged if we drop from the sample bureaucrats who (i) are matched to multiple voter registration records,

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[S5]Although the OPM explicitly provides procurement-specific occupation codes, there are also a series of generic clerical occupation codes under which procurement officers are classified. We use the explicit occupation codes of 1102 (Contracting series), 1105 (Purchasing series), 1106 (Procurement clerical and technician series).

[S6]Appendix Figure A.6 (black line) shows the match rate to the L2 conditional on procurement officers being linked to the OPM over time.

TABLE E.I

POLITICAL CYCLES AMONG POLITICAL APPOINTEES AND CIVIL SERVANTS—ROBUSTNESS TO DIFFERENT
SAMPLE RESTRICTIONS.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Employee is Democrat				Employee is Republican			
Sample:	All	Uniquely matched	Constant affiliation	No party imputation	All	Uniquely matched	Constant affiliation	No party imputation
Panel A: Political Appointees								
President Democrat	0.494 (0.008)	0.519 (0.009)	0.528 (0.009)	0.514 (0.012)				
President Republican					0.458 (0.008)	0.478 (0.009)	0.499 (0.009)	0.474 (0.012)
Observations	139,114	125,662	115,572	75,738	139,114	125,662	115,572	75,738
Effect size	171%	197%	189%	165%	371%	398%	458%	558%
Panel B: Civil Servants								
President Democrat	−0.002 (0.000)	−0.002 (0.000)	−0.002 (0.000)	−0.002 (0.000)				
President Republican					0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Observations	58,882,915	55,795,418	51,933,276	37,395,177	58,882,915	55,795,418	51,933,276	37,395,177
Effect size	−0.4%	−0.4%	−0.4%	−0.4%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
Bureau FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Regression estimates of the party alignment effect for different sample restrictions. Columns 1 and 5 present the main estimates on the full sample (as in columns 1 and 5 of Table II); columns 2 and 6 drop from the sample bureaucrats who are matched to multiple voter registration records; columns 3 and 7 drop from the sample bureaucrats who change party affiliation across different L2 waves, and columns 4 and 8 drop from the sample bureaucrats who are matched to voter registration records in states where L2 models party affiliation. Panel A restricts the sample to political appointees, and Panel B restricts the sample to civil servants. See the notes to Table II for additional details on the estimation. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level.

(ii) change party affiliation across different L2 waves, and (iii) are matched to voter registration records in states where L2 models party affiliation. Appendix Table E.I presents estimates from columns 1 and 5 of Table II for these different sample restrictions. Appendix Table E.II presents estimates from column 3 of Table IV, applying the same sample restrictions; the extent of political cycles for political appointees, the political insulation of civil servants, and the effect of alignment on cost overruns are similar in these different samples.

TABLE E.II

POLITICAL ALIGNMENT REDUCES COST OVERRUN—ROBUSTNESS TO DIFFERENT SAMPLE RESTRICTIONS.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Relative cost overrun			
Mean of dep. var	0.186	0.165	0.164	0.159
Panel A: Politically aligned				
Politically aligned	−0.011	−0.012	−0.012	−0.010
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Panel B: Share aligned				
Share politically aligned	−0.013	−0.014	−0.013	−0.011
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Year × Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department × Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	All	Uniquely matched	Constant affiliation	No party imputation
Observations	1,079,923	973,079	913,596	644,549

Note: The unit of observation is the contract. *Relative cost overrun* is the difference between the actual costs and the expected costs, normalized by the expected costs (see Equation (1)). *Politically aligned* is a dummy that is 1 if the procurement officer and president are from the same party in the year the contract was created, and 0 otherwise. *Share politically aligned* is the share of a given contract's expected duration in which the procurement officer and the president were from the same party. Column 1 is the baseline specification, corresponding to Table IV, Panel A. In column 2, the sample is restricted to individuals to who could be uniquely matched. In column 3, the sample is restricted to individuals who did not change party affiliation over time. In column 4, the sample excludes states in which L2 imputes the party affiliation. Controls comprise: *Years of experience fixed effects*, *Log(Contract size in USD)*, *Log(expected duration in days)*, *Log(total contracts created in a given year and quarter)*, *industry (NAICS)* fixed effects, *award type* FEs, *contract pricing* FEs, *product service code* FEs. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the procurement officer-level.

APPENDIX F: ROBUSTNESS OF RESULTS TO IPW

Despite a match rate of 67.5%, concerns over selection into our data may remain. To address these concerns as much as possible, we resort to inverse probability weighting (IPW) (see, e.g., Horvitz and Thompson 1952, Wooldridge 2007, 2002, Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder 2003). IPW is a nonparametric procedure by which individual observations are reweighted according to the estimated probability that they are part of the sample. As Wooldridge (2002) explained, IPW purges estimates of selection bias provided that selection is well captured by observable characteristics.

F.1. *OPM*

To operationalize this approach, we empirically predict whether a bureaucrat can be matched to our voter registration data based on age (using five bins—less than 30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–60, more than 60), educational achievement (college, more than college), his/her numbers of quarters in the federal bureaucracy, pay (using $10,000 bins), and an indicator for being employed in D.C. As Table F.I shows, mean differences between the matched and unmatched samples are—by virtue of inverse probability weighting—negligible. More importantly, as Figure F.1 and Figure F.2 show, relying on IPW to account for selection yields results that are qualitatively equivalent to those in Figure 2 and Figure 3.

TABLE F.I

AVERAGE DIFFERENCES IN OBSERVABLES BETWEEN MATCHED AND UNMATCHED BUREAUCRATS
(OPM)—IPW.

	(1) Matched	(2)	(3) Unmatched	(4)
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
Age less than 30	0.433	0.496	0.434	0.496
Age 30–40	0.253	0.435	0.259	0.438
Age 40–50	0.168	0.374	0.168	0.374
Age 50–60	0.108	0.310	0.105	0.306
Age more than 60	0.038	0.190	0.034	0.182
Highest education: college	0.227	0.419	0.227	0.419
Highest education: more than college	0.259	0.438	0.261	0.439
Quarters in federal bureaucracy	38.272	42.904	37.931	42.902
Annual pay	39,934.67	33,823.35	41,235.35	34,831.09
Employed in D.C.	0.123	0.329	0.123	0.328
Observations	1,985,726		955,188	

Note: Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) of individuals for which party affiliation is available (matched, columns 1–2) and for those for which party affiliation is unavailable (unmatched, columns 3–4). Matched sample is reweighted to match the full sample based on the age (five age bins as shown in table), education (college, more than college), quarters in the federal bureaucracy (exact quarters), pay (bins of $10,000), and being employed in D.C. Sample includes all civil servants with non-redacted names serving between 1997 and 2019.


FIGURE F.1.—Partisan affiliation of political appointees—IPW. *Notes*: Share of political appointees (presidential appointments, non-career senior executive service, Schedule C appointees) by party over time. Dashed vertical lines mark presidential terms. Matched sample is reweighted to match the full sample based on the age (five age bins as shown in table), education (college, more than college), quarters in the federal bureaucracy (exact quarters), pay (bins of $10,000), and being employed in D.C. Sample includes all civil servants with non-redacted names serving between 1997 and 2019.

F.2. *Procurement Results*

Since we do not have procurement officer covariates for those contracts overseen by officers that are unmatched to the OPM, we reweight the matched sample to be representative of all contracts based on the initial contract size (bins of $2500), duration

FIGURE F.2.—Partisan affiliation of civil servants—IPW. *Notes*: Share of (non-political) civil servants (competitive service, career senior executive service, excepted service) by party over time. Dashed vertical lines mark presidential terms. Matched sample is reweighted to match the full sample based on the age (five age bins as shown in table), education (college, more than college), quarters in the federal bureaucracy (exact quarters), pay (bins of $10,000), and being employed in D.C. Sample includes all civil servants with non-redacted names serving between 1997 and 2019.

TABLE F.II

AVERAGE DIFFERENCES IN OBSERVABLES BETWEEN MATCHED AND UNMATCHED CONTRACTS (PROCUREMENT)—IPW.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Matched | | Unmatched | |
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
Log(Initial contract size)	9.655	2.105	9.656	2.072
Log(Expected duration)	4.637	1.515	4.654	1.510
Experience (Years in federal bureaucracy)	3.518	3.070	3.504	3.066
Observations	1,296,564		1,513,768	

Note: Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) of contracts overseen by procurement officers for which party affiliation is available (matched, columns 1–2) and for those for which party affiliation is unavailable (unmatched, columns 3–4). Matched sample is reweighted to match the full sample based on the initial contract size (bins of $2500), expected duration (5 bins), years of experience (5 bins).

(5 bins), and procurement officer experience (as measured by the years we observe an officer in the procurement data, 5 bins). We coarsen the continuous variables in order to obtain cells with sufficient sample size for reweighting. The results, however, are not sensitive to the particular choice of binning. As Table F.II shows, reweighting the sample effectively eliminates the differences we observe in terms of the covariates on which we match. As Table F.III shows, relying on IPW to account for selection yields results that are qualitatively equivalent to those reported in the main text.

TABLE F.III

COST OVERRUN AND POLITICAL ALIGNMENT—IPW.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Relative cost overrun			
Mean of dep. var	0.186	0.186	0.186	0.186
Politically aligned	−0.010645	−0.010585		
	(0.004000)	(0.003942)		
Share politically aligned			−0.012669	−0.012719
			(0.004142)	(0.004050)
Year × Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Experience (years) FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department × Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weighting	None	IPW	None	IPW
Observations	1,079,923	1,079,923	1,079,923	1,079,923

Note: The unit of observation is the contract. The dependent variable is *Relative cost overrun*: the difference between the actual costs and the expected costs, normalized by the expected costs. *Politically aligned* is a dummy that is 1 if the procurement officer and president are from the same party when the contract was created, and 0 otherwise. *Share politically aligned* is the share of a given contract's expected duration in which the procurement officer and the president were from the same party. Columns 1 and 3 report the unweighted estimates, while columns 2 and 4 report the estimates using inverse probability weighting (IPW). We reweight based on initial contract size (bins of $2500), duration (5 bins), and the procurement officer's experience (5 bins). Controls comprise: *Years of experience fixed effects*, *Log(Contract size in USD)*, *Log(expected duration in days)*, *Log(total contracts created in a given year and quarter)*, *industry (NAICS)* fixed effects, *award type* FEs, *contract pricing* FEs, *product service code* FEs. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the procurement officer-level.

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